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Abstract
Conclusions about the potential for peace via power-sharing are mixed. For some, power-sharing does little to
overcome the commitment problem characterizing a transition from conflict, while others argue that such conces-
sions provide signals of parties’ willingness to incur costs. This article develops and tests a new theory, aiming to shed
light on the mechanisms through which power-sharing bargains help to overcome the commitment problem. I argue
that government parties tend to hold an electoral and military advantage, which heightens incentives for rebel leaders
to defect from a settlement prior to conceding their capacity to use violence. Where settlements provide discrete
guarantees that offset the risks of electoral defeat and the co-optation of forces, these incentives for pre-emptive
defection should be mitigated. I offer a novel disaggregation of provisional power-sharing subtypes, distinguishing
between long-term and short-term arrangements. The analysis rests on an original, cross-national dataset of
government-and-rebel dyads to negotiated settlements signed between 1975 and 2015 (N ¼ 168). The logistic
regression results clearly indicate that power-sharing settlements stipulating ‘consociational’-style reforms are signif-
icantly more likely to resolve conflict between settlement dyads, all else equal. Meanwhile, standard conceptualiza-
tions of power-sharing, which include transitional coalitions and troop integration, appear unlikely to secure rebel
commitment beyond the transition period, which helps to explain the contradictory findings in existing research.
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Introduction
Recent events in Syria have only reified lessons learned in
Somalia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – military interven-
tion is a costly and often counterproductive strategy,
which risks prolonging conflict and entrenching interna-
tional actors in domestic disputes (Howe, 1997; Lutt-
wak, 1999; Von Hippel, 2000; Fortna & Howard,
2008). There is an emerging consensus that, wherever
possible, international efforts should instead focus on
convincing belligerent parties to come to the table and
reach agreement on the terms of peace. Protracted peace
processes in Afghanistan, Libya, Cyprus, and South
Sudan are just a few recent examples of the international
commitment to brokering negotiated solutions, even
when facing highly unfavorable conditions. The result
of this normative shift has been a marked increase in the
frequency of settlements signed to end intrastate conflict
(Fazal, 2014; Toft, 2010; Licklider, 1995), from just
15 prior to the end of the Cold War to more than 80 over
the subsequent decade and a half (see Figure 1). At the
same time, negotiated settlements have evolved from a
tool for conflict resolution to a cornerstone of post-
conflict democratization, exhibited by a corresponding
transformation in substantive content. While agreements
to share power were relatively rare prior to 1990, more
than two-thirds of settlements have entailed some form
of power-sharing in the period since.
Despite these trends, there is little agreement among
scholars and policymakers about the kinds of terms that
might increase the prospects for peace. Often, the blame
for settlement breakdown is placed on exogenous factors,
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such as the vague and contradictory mandate of peace-
keepers, a vacuum of state authority, or opportunities for
rent predation. Where the analytical focus is on settle-
ment content, however, power-sharing is understood as a
particularly unstable arrangement, prone to degenerate
into renewed violence without third-party enforcement
(Sisk, 1996; Spears, 2000; Walter, 2002, 2004; Collier,
Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2008; Mukherjee, 2006; Toft,
2010; Jarstad, 2006; Tull & Mehler, 2005). A wealth
of qualitative work has illustrated the dangers of power-
sharing failures through cautionary tales such as Rwanda
(Clapham, 1998; Traniello, 2008; Stettenheim, 2000),
Angola (MacQueen 2016; Ottoway, 1998; Spears,
1999), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Koko,
2007; Lemarchand, 2007; Rogier, 2016). Yet, this over-
whelming academic skepticism stands in stark relief to
the predominant toolkit of international mediators, beg-
ging the question: are power-sharing settlements
doomed to fail, or are certain formulas more or less likely
to improve the prospects for peace?
Although a burgeoning literature speaks to this puz-
zle, few scholars have systematically unpacked the provi-
sional variation that exists within the umbrella category
of power-sharing settlements. Among the few excep-
tions, it is commonly accepted that political power-
sharing – or shared rule among belligerents – is unlikely
to succeed without additional measures helping to
reduce mutual fears (Mattes & Savun, 2009; Schneck-
ener, 2002; Spears, 2000), offset implementation failures
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007), or devolve power to the
group level (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008; Rothchild & Hart-
zell, 2014). This study contributes to this field by offer-
ing a novel disaggregation of power-sharing subtypes,
specifically focusing on the distinction between short-
term and long-term solutions, which aims to shed light
on the mechanisms that explain why rebels are more
likely to comply with certain bargains than others.
Table I provides a cursory illustration of the main axis
of variation, focusing on a subset of power-sharing set-
tlements signed in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and
2005. It reveals that many of these bargains – including
the three ‘cautionary tales’ cited above – are transitional
formulas, which fail to stipulate any long-term constitu-
tional changes that would mitigate the electoral advan-
tage enjoyed by incumbents, guarantee representation to
opposition groups, or transform the political landscape
that initially generated conflict. In other cases, however,
agreements involve more sweeping and permanent insti-
tutional reforms. Like well-known cases beyond Africa,
such as Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina, these
settlements entail not just a transition to multiparty
democracy, but to a particular form of democracy in
which institutions are designed to mitigate conflict ten-
dencies by reducing the stakes of national elections (Lij-
phart, 2004). For example, unlike the transitional 1993
governing coalition between Rwanda’s Hutu govern-
ment and Tutsi rebels, whose breakdown resulted in
genocide, the proportional representation (PR) system
included in Burundi’s 2003 Pretoria Protocol granted
an effective legislative veto to its Tutsi minority beyond
the transition period.
This variation within the category of political power-
sharing has been overlooked in relevant scholarship to
date, justifying the need for more careful theorizing
about the role of negotiated institutional solutions in
stabilizing post-conflict transitions. Traditional, ration-
alist approaches emphasize that this period is character-
ized by a commitment dilemma (Walter, 2002), and this
study does not depart from this framework. Rather, it
draws on the few pieces of scholarship that acknowledge
the asymmetrical costs of compliance facing government
and rebel parties (Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed, 2017;
Mattes & Savun, 2009), placing this theoretical logic
front and center – to my knowledge, for the first time.
I argue that the electoral advantage habitually enjoyed by
incumbents heightens incentives for rebels to defect
prior to conceding their capacity to use violence and,
hence, their bargaining power. Settlements in which
power-sharing formulas are designed to expire at the end
of the transitional period – generally marked by national
multiparty elections – are therefore particularly prone to
pre-emptive defection by rebels. In contrast, settlements
that contain guarantees that the opposition will be
included in future levers of decisionmaking and resource
Figure 1. Frequency of negotiated settlements signed world-
wide over five-year periods, 1975–2015 (N ¼ 124)
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allocation, regardless of who wins the post-conflict elec-
tion, should mitigate incentives to defect.
The next section provides an overview of the current
debate about power-sharing and the commitment
dilemma in the conflict literature. In the third section,
I present my theory about the ways in which power-
sharing can help to overcome commitment problems
and achieve a willing buy-in of rebel elites to democratic
rules of competition, rather than violence. The following
section describes the process of data collection and mea-
surement of key variables used in the empirical analysis.
In light of existing data constraints, it rests on an origi-
nal, cross-national dataset of rebel–government dyads to
negotiated settlements signed worldwide between 1975
and 2015 (N¼ 168). The results of the binomial logistic
regression of conflict termination, presented in the fifth
section, support the central argument about the role of
long-term power-sharing guarantees. The predicted
probability of conflict termination is significantly higher
where power-sharing agreements entail constitutional
reforms, as compared to transitional bargains. The last
section concludes, with attention to areas for future
research.
Existing research
There are extensive literatures available on bargaining for
peace (Licklider, 1995; Mason & Fett, 1996; Mason,
Weingarten & Fett, 1999; Powell, 2002) and on insti-
tutional variation across power-sharing democracies (Lij-
phart, 1969, 2004, 2012; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005;
Norris, 2008; Gates et al., 2016; Slater & Simmons,
2013). However, the analytical focus of this study is
on the role of power-sharing during the intermediary
period, when signatory parties make important decisions
about whether to comply with their commitments to the
terms of peace, or else defect back to the battlefield. It is
in this precise arena that approaches from the subfields of
international relations (IR) and comparative politics con-
verge, and as a result – and despite significant academic
attention and advancement – findings have been much
more mixed (Jarstad, 2006).
Due to the literature’s evolution from IR theories of
war, the theoretical starting point is a rationalist
approach, with settlement breakdown commonly under-
stood as a reflection of bargaining failures under condi-
tions of heightened uncertainty (Fearon, 1995; Powell,
2002, 2006; Werner, 1999; Posen, 1993; Lake & Roth-
child, 1996). The seminal model elaborated in Barbara
Walter’s (2002) Committing to Peace predicts an equili-
brium of mutual defection, since neither party can cred-
ibly commit to peace. Beyond a classic prisoner’s
dilemma, however, the conditions of the game further
reduce the possibility of a best-case outcome since
mutual compliance allows ‘nature’ to determine a
winner – in the form of post-conflict elections – making
parties even less willing to accept the risk of unilateral
demobilization. From this perspective, promises to share
power should do little to change the prevailing credibility
dilemma in the absence of third-party enforcement
(Fortna, 2008).
Table I. Provisional variation across African power-sharing settlements, 1990–2005
Country Year Settlement name Type of political power-sharing Conflict terminates? a
South Africa 1991 National Peace Accord Constitutional P
Mozambique 1992 General Peace Accord Constitutional P
Somalia 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement Transitional
Rwanda 1994 Arusha Accord Transitional
Angola 1994 Lusaka Protocol Transitional
Mali 1995 Bamako Peace Pact (Pacte National) Constitutional P
Liberia 1995–96 Abuja Accords Transitional
Burundi 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement Transitional
Sierra Leone 2001 Lomé Peace Agreement Transitional
Angola 2002 Memorandum of Understanding Constitutional P
Côte d’Ivoire 2003–05 Linas-Marcoussis/Accra Agreements Transitional
Liberia 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Constitutional P
DR Congo 2003 The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue Transitional
Comoros 2003 Famboni I/II Agreements Constitutional P
Burundi 2003–04 Pretoria Protocol and Power-Sharing Accord Constitutional P
Sudan 2005 Cairo Agreement Constitutional P
aIdentified as the cessation of dyadic conflict within six months of the settlement date and lasting at least five years. Conflict data are from the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
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Yet, a wealth of empirical evidence exists to challenge
this conclusion; just as international intervention cannot
guarantee settlement success, neither is it always neces-
sary to a peaceful transition. Peacekeepers may merely
sustain what Galtung (2011) refers to as a ‘negative’
peace – characterized by the absence of violence but
remaining highly unstable and prone to breakdown with
the inevitable exit of international actors (Downs &
Stedman, 2002; De Waal, 2009). Recognizing this,
other scholars have proposed that a settlement’s content
may play a role in helping to reduce mutual fears and
improve credibility. From this perspective, agreeing to
share power serves as a signal of parties’ willingness to
bear costs and, thus, commitment to abandoning the
fight (Mattes & Savun, 2009; Jarstad & Nilsson,
2008; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mukherjee, 2006;
Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2001).
While the logic of ‘costly signaling’ provides valuable
insights about the ways in which the terms might help to
resolve commitment failures, the underlying mechan-
isms have not been clearly and consistently spelled out
in the existing literature. The theoretical implication is
that it is rebels’ perceptions about the likelihood that the
settlement will be implemented that ultimately predict
compliance or defection. In this way, the terms play only
an indirect role in decisionmaking, rather than factoring
directly into rebels’ calculations about their post-
transition payoff. In fact, a range of provisions beyond
power-sharing may play a similarly costly and benevolent
role in signaling a willingness to comply – from issuing a
blanket amnesty, to inviting peacekeepers, to building
all-inclusive commissions for oversight or arbitration
(Mattes & Savun, 2009).
Moreover, based on extant empirical findings, it
remains unclear exactly which kind of power-sharing
formulas might prove sufficiently costly to guarantee
compliance. Hartzell & Hoddie (2007) propose that
more comprehensive power-sharing settlements are sig-
nificantly more likely to stick, suggesting that the various
power-sharing subtypes – political, territorial, military,
and economic – should have little effect independently.
In contrast, numerous studies have concluded that terri-
torial forms of power-sharing provide the most durable
solution to violent conflict among subnational groups
(Rothchild & Hartzell, 2014; Jarstad & Nilsson,
2008). Political power-sharing is perhaps subject to the
most heated debate – although Mattes & Savun (2009)
find some evidence for a positive effect, the vast majority
of scholarship suggests that formulas involving shared
rule are especially unstable. The next section addresses
this impasse.
A theory of pre-emptive defection
While it is widely acknowledged that transition periods
are critical to lasting peace (Lyons, 2004; Höglund,
Jarstad & Kovacs, 2009), the strategic calculations of
signatory parties during this crucial phase remain
under-theorized. Walter’s (2002) much-cited model spe-
cifies moves to comply – or more accurately, to demo-
bilize – as equally costly for both government and rebel
parties, with nature determining electoral victory at ran-
dom. In reality, however, compliance threatens to place
rebels in an especially vulnerable position vis-à-vis the
state, for two reasons. First, although the government
party may stand down from direct confrontation, it
never fully demobilizes. Claiming a legitimate monopoly
on the use of violence means that the state remains ‘bet-
ter equipped to impose [its] most preferred outcome’
(Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed, 2017: 1176). Rebels,
on the other hand, have a diminished capacity to ‘induce
concessions by inflicting costs on the state’ with each
move made towards full disarmament (Sawyer, Cun-
ningham & Reed, 2017: 1178).
Second, although multiparty elections involve some
uncertainty, electoral outcomes are not determined by a
coin toss. Given its preferential access to state coffers and
institutions – and, therefore, the capacity to deploy coer-
cion, patronage, or outright manipulation in order to
ensure victory – the incumbent almost always has the
upper hand in the electoral arena. In many cases, incum-
bent entrenchment is a key driver of the initial onset of
violence, with opposition groups perceiving conven-
tional avenues to accessing power closed off. Where
competing parties have recently been at war, the fear of
potential retaliation from rivals may heighten incentives
for incumbents to avoid electoral defeat at all costs
(Cheeseman, 2015).
Surprisingly few scholars have explicitly recognized
the disproportionate leverage enjoyed by the government
party in a transition, and the ways in which this raises the
stakes of elections (Mattes & Savun, 2009: 739; Sawyer,
Cunningham & Reed, 2017; Höglund, Jarstad &
Kovacs, 2009; Matlosa & Shale, 2013; Plank, 2017).
In contrast to standard rationalist approaches, in which
settlement failure hinges on parties’ inability to commit
under conditions of uncertainty, this perspective sheds
light on the importance of rebel elites’ calculations about
the relative profitability of the agreed terms after the end
of the transition period, as compared to a return to war.
Of course, a signed settlement is never an iron-clad guar-
antee – the government can always delay implementa-
tion or renege on its promises. And yet, a number of
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notable cases exist in which rebels chose to defect in spite
of apparent compliance by the government party. In the
oft-cited Angolan example, implementation was pro-
ceeding on schedule when the results of first-round
1992 presidential elections – overwhelmingly favoring
the incumbent – prompted defection by rebel UNITA
leader Jonas Savimbi. As a transition progresses, increas-
ingly less uncertainty remains about which side is likely
to win, either electorally or militarily, once rebels demo-
bilize. Unless the settlement provides discrete guarantees
that effectively reduce the risk of electoral defeat, polit-
ical exclusion, and a return to the pre-conflict status quo,
the optimal strategy for the likely loser is to defect while
the capacity to do so remains. In theoretical terms, there-
fore, any government concessions likely to be perceived
as sufficiently costly to secure rebel commitment must be
understood through this lens.
The implications of the theory point to three testable
hypotheses. First, given the advantage of incumbency,
political power-sharing provisions should only help to
secure rebel commitment where they diminish the
imperative of mobilizing majority support. That a
trade-off often exists in plural societies between electoral
accountability and political stability has long been recog-
nized by comparativists (Horowitz, 1993; Andeweg,
2000; Lijphart, 2004, 2012; Slater & Simmons,
2013). The literature on democratic ‘crafting’ and ‘pact-
ing’ reveals case-specific strategies that worked to achieve
elite buy-in during Third Wave transitions in Southern
Europe and Latin America, which often came at the
expense of pure representativeness (O’Donnell &
Schmitter, 1986; Di Palma, 1990). Arend Lijphart
(1977: 238) has famously argued that the realistic choice
for conflict-prone societies ‘is not between the British
normative model of democracy and the consociational
model, but between consociational democracy and no
democracy at all’.
And yet, in the extant conflict literature, the typical
approach to political power-sharing is an umbrella con-
cept encapsulating both constitutionalized,
consociational-style reforms and transitional coalitions.
As an example, the DRC’s ‘1þ4’ power-sharing formula
was hailed as revolutionary in its distribution of the pre-
sidency and four vice presidencies among leaders of rival
armed groups (Koko, 2007); yet, both the executive
coalition and unity government were disbanded with
2006 national elections, and the 2003 settlement failed
to otherwise alter the political landscape of the regime in
a way that would improve the position of former rebels
or the societal groups they represented. In one insightful
account, defection by the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (RCD) was a direct response to what was
ultimately a poor showing in presidential and parliamen-
tary elections, in which they garnered less than 5% of
vote share: ‘[t]he RCD was aware [ . . . ] [that it] had little
hope of winning in the 2006 elections. For the RCD
leadership [ . . . ] the new rebellion was a means of keep-
ing their influence in eastern Congo in the case of elec-
toral defeat’ (Stearns, 2011: 322–323). In Comoros,
however, violence was resolved with a permanent insti-
tutional solution: a rotating presidency system, which
encourages competition within ethnically homogenous
islands rather than between them. Meanwhile, in Bur-
undi, an effective solution combined over-representation
of minority Tutsis with a two-thirds parliamentary
majority required to pass major legislation, which ‘effec-
tively reduced the costs of losing an election and guar-
anteed Tutsis political representation and jobs whatever
the outcome of the polls’ (Cheeseman, 2015: 209).
While the possible formulas are as varied as are conflict
cases, the common thread is that, in order to improve
rebels’ commitment to demobilize willingly, political
forms of power-sharing should provide long-term guar-
antees that offset the risk of competing in elections
against an advantaged incumbent.
H1: All else equal, political power-sharing settlements
that include provisions for constitutional reforms
should be positively associated with conflict termina-
tion, while transitional coalitions should have a neg-
ative effect.
Overlooking the difference between long-term and
short-term bargains – and the respective impact on the
decisionmaking of signatories – has generated a false
dichotomy in the field. There seems to be little debate
that territorial forms of power-sharing – Lijphart’s
(1969, 1977) ‘segmental autonomy’ of groups – provide
more durable and effective solutions to conflict, as com-
pared to political power-sharing at the national level
(Rothchild & Hartzell, 2014; Zanker, Simons & Meh-
ler, 2014). Whether the conceptual distinction is
between ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule’ (Schneckener,
2002), or similarly between ‘power-sharing’ and ‘power
dividing’ provisions (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Wolff,
2007), scholars consistently incorporate constitutional
and transitional institutional bargains into the category
of inclusive solutions, while in contrast, the territorial
devolution of power requires constitutional reform by
nature. For Jarstad & Nilsson (2008), in fact, the finding
in favor of territorial power-sharing rests on the fact that
political solutions are less ‘sticky’ and easier to reverse.
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However, there is no reason to expect that incumbents
are any less able to renege on territorial reforms than on
national-level reforms, once constitutionalized. In more
ethnically fractionalized countries, moreover, the terri-
torial interspersion of groups may preclude segmental
autonomy, requiring non-territorial mechanisms to
reduce the majoritarian, winner-take-all nature of
national elections.
H2: All else equal, both inclusive and diffusive power-
sharing settlements should be positively associated
with conflict termination where provisions entail con-
stitutional reforms
Important advancements in the conflict literature
include recognizing that other kinds of bargains, beyond
political, may be key to resolving conflict. To date, how-
ever, conceptualizing ‘military power-sharing’ tends to
misconstrue the role of power-sharing provisions in
incentivizing rebel commitment by including troop inte-
gration in the definition (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003;
Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008;
Mattes & Savun, 2009). The incorporation of rank-
and-file rebels into the national military requires rebel
elites to forfeit their most valuable bargaining chip in the
run-up to elections: the capacity to inflict costs on the
state, or else return to war. According to the logic of pre-
emptive defection, doing so risks tipping the scales fur-
ther in the incumbent’s favor, enabling the ruling party
to use its newfound military advantage to manipulate
elections or wipe out its rival unilaterally (Höglund, Jar-
stad & Kovacs, 2009). A Weberian approach to the
concept of ‘power’1-sharing suggests that rebel leaders
should only be willing to forfeit their troops where set-
tlements include additional guarantees about their own
co-optation into levers of security sector decisionmaking.
It is therefore unsurprising that empirical findings have
been inconsistent about the effectiveness of military
power-sharing, even as a formal theory about the impor-
tance of a ‘robust overhaul of the security sector’ has
been clearly and convincingly laid out elsewhere
(Wantchekon, 2000).
H3: All else equal, settlements involving military
power-sharing in the officer corps or Ministry of
Defense should be positively associated with conflict
termination, while provisions on troop integration
should have no effect.
In sum, the theory proposed in this section empha-
sizes the strategic calculations of rebel signatories during
a transition. While the precise power-sharing formula is
likely to vary depending on the incompatibility underly-
ing conflict, the key to overcoming the commitment
dilemma hinges on whether a settlement reduces the
perceived risks associated with rebel demobilization.
Without such guarantees, the nexus of conflict merely
shifts from the battlefield to the electoral arena, thereby
raising the stakes of post-conflict elections and heighten-
ing incentives to defect.
Data and methods
The proposed hypotheses rest on the notion that there
are deficiencies in the current academic conceptualiza-
tion of power-sharing, which are also reflected in the
existing data. The UCDP Peace Agreement dataset
(Högbladh, 2011), for example, provides only a dichot-
omous measure of the inclusion of power-sharing provi-
sions of any type, while independent attempts to
disaggregate provisional subtypes have failed to distin-
guish between short-term and long-term political bar-
gains, as well as between elite military co-optation and
troop integration (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad &
Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009). The University
of Notre Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix provides detailed
information on content, but the project focuses only on
the most comprehensive peace agreements, lacking clear
selection criteria and limiting variation on key variables.
The present analysis therefore relies on an original data-
set of negotiated settlements signed worldwide between
1975 and 2015.2
Following Reiter (2016) and others, I relied on a wide
range of sources to identify settlements and obtain full
texts, especially the UN Peacemaker Library, Ulster’s
Transitional Justice INCORE database, and the US
Institute of Peace. For comparative purposes, a settle-
ment must meet the following definition to be included:
(a) be mutually accepted and signed by at least two actors
actively fighting an intrastate conflict, (b) be viewed as a
definitive solution, and (c) include substantive provisions
intended to maintain the peace. The first criterion
excludes cross-border conflicts and those ending in seces-
sion, such that signatories expect to coexist in the same
1 Weber (1946: 180) defines power as ‘the chance of a man or of a
number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even
against the resistance of others who are participating in the same
action’.
2 Prior to the late 1970s, negotiated solutions to intrastate conflicts
were exceedingly rare, particularly those involving power-sharing.
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political space. It also eliminates settlements involving
political entities that are only loosely affiliated with
armed militias, such as Northern Ireland’s Good Friday
Agreement. I rely on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallens-
teen, 2013) to identify rebel signatories as active at the
time of signing. To allow for variation in conflict termi-
nation both across settlements and across rebel parties,
the dataset is structured by government–rebel dyad.
The second and third criteria ensure that the baseline
category for analysis – settlements without power-
sharing – comprises legitimate attempts to resolve con-
flict issues, such that rebels agree to disarm in exchange
for some package of concessions. This avoids agree-
ments signed where conflicts are dormant or heavily
lopsided (Kreutz, 2010), and it excludes ceasefires,
which are generally viewed as a temporary hiatus to
facilitate negotiations and are, therefore, especially
prone to conflict recurrence (Toft, 2010). Where mul-
tiple documents are signed as part of the same contin-
uous peace process, they are combined and coded as the
same settlement;3 in contrast, if one settlement degen-
erates into renewed violence, leading to fresh negotia-
tions and new bargain, the cases are coded discretely. In
total, the dataset includes 168 dyads across 124 nego-
tiated settlements signed in 48 counties over the rele-
vant time period.
The analytical goal is to determine whether certain
provisions are more likely to definitively resolve conflict
by securing rebel commitment. This outcome is likely
driven by different mechanisms than the duration of
peace, which may be sensitive to the presence of peace-
keepers (Fortna, 2008), spoiler behavior (Nilsson, 2008;
Reiter, 2016), or the timing of elections (Brancati &
Snyder, 2013). The dependent variable is therefore a
dichotomous measure of Conflict termination, coded as
1 if the rebel party drops out of the UCDP Armed
Conflict dataset within six months of the settlement and
remains inactive for at least five years – a standard bench-
mark for scholars interested in conflict settlement (Wal-
ter, 2002: 53). Empirically, it is unlikely that groups will
retain or regain the organizational capacity to relaunch
rebellion after this point, and this coding strategy limits
the censorship of observations to three settlements
signed after December 2014.4 Since UCDP’s discrete
coding of armed groups occasionally masks cases of con-
flict recurrence, I also consulted the Non-State Actor
(NSA) dataset’s Prevactive variable to determine whether
signatories re-emerged as a new rebellion (Cunningham,
Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013). Conflict terminated
between 72 of the 168 settlement dyads, or 43.1%.
Independent variables
The dataset codifies various provisional subtypes of
power-sharing with an updated reading of each settle-
ment text. In a handful of cases, the document could not
be obtained, and I therefore relied on a range of media
and academic sources to determine content. The Online
appendix provides a definition and description of each
variable, as well as notable examples, references, and a
table of all coding decisions, clustered by settlement.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparative frequency of relevant
provisional subtypes across all 124 settlements.
In line with existing literature, I identify any terms
stipulating the inclusion of belligerent parties in national
governing institutions as political power-sharing.
Departing from standard approaches, however, I distin-
guish between Political: transitional provisions, involving
inclusive executive coalitions or unity governments
designed to expire at the end of a transition period, and
Political: constitutional provisions, in which reforms guar-
antee representation in institutions of governance and
policymaking beyond elections. The latter includes a
Figure 2. Frequency of provisional subtypes in the full sample
of negotiated settlements, 1975–2015 (N ¼ 124)
3 Examples include the Islamabad and Jalalabad Agreements in
Afghanistan; the Los Pozos and San Francisco Agreements in
Colombia; the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and the Final
Act in DR Congo; the Pacte National and Bamako Peace Pact in
Mali; and the Moscow Peace Treaty and Khasavyourt Accord in
Russia.
4 Central African Republic’s Republican Pacte for Peace, Mali’s
Algiers Process Agreement, and South Sudan’s Agreement on the
Resolution of Conflict.
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range of possible reforms, which may be addressed either
to rebel parties directly or to the societal groups they
represent. Electoral quotas, PR rules, or effective legisla-
tive vetoes are common solutions in parliamentary
democracies,5 while presidential systems may be more
likely to address the distribution of ministerial posi-
tions.6 Both variables are dummies, coded as 1 if relevant
provisions are present and 0 otherwise. While 35.5% of
settlements include agreement on transitional power-
sharing, the proportion falls to 17.7% where the bargain
entails long-term constitutional reforms.
Second, in order to improve operationalization of the
concept of Military power-sharing, I measure relevant
provisions as those involving a restructuring of the high
command, officer corps, or Ministry of Defense in order
to include rebel leaders. This is clearly distinguishable
from provisions on Troop integration, which merely
require that ex-combatants be incorporated into the
national military. Again, each variable is coded as 1 if
provisions are present and 0 otherwise. Unsurprisingly,
provisions on the integration of forces are much more
common than military power-sharing – at 52.4% and
18.5% of all settlements, respectively.
Next, I use these updated measures to test the validity
of my own theory against those who have found territor-
ial solutions to be more durable than those involving
shared rule. I follow a number of scholars who, using
various conceptual labels, distinguish between inclusive
and diffusive mechanisms for sharing power (Roeder &
Rothchild, 2005; Schneckener, 2002; Wolff, 2007). The
coding of Diffusive power-sharing corresponds to existing
definitions of ‘territorial’ power-sharing, in that the set-
tlement stipulates a devolution of resource wealth or
political, administrative, or fiscal powers away from the
national level: 1 if present and 0 otherwise. In measuring
Inclusive power-sharing, however, I depart from existing
measures by requiring that either Political: constitutional
or Military power-sharing provisions be present, or both,
but excluding Political: transitional provisions. Interest-
ingly, the two provisional subtypes appear in the sample
in a relatively similar proportion: 29.8% of settlements
include diffusive forms of power-sharing, compared to
25% for inclusive provisions. Finally, I code Any power-
sharing as 1 if any of the following provisional subtypes is
present: Political: transitional, Political: constitutional,
Military, or Diffusive. It is 0 otherwise – the baseline
analytical category. The majority of settlements (71%)
include agreement on some form of power-sharing.
It is possible that warring parties are more willing to
accept costly compromises in certain contexts, such as
where conflict has reached a hurting stalemate or where
rivals have a clear advantage (Mason & Fett, 1996;
Mason, Weingarten & Fett, 1999), and that this explains
the willingness of signatories to comply rather than risk
recurrence. In other words, power-sharing bargains may
arise where conflicts are already ripe for resolution. Set-
tlements evolve out of bargaining processes, making it
impossible to randomize provisional content. In order to
address concerns about spuriousness, I regressed each
power-sharing subtype against the range of covariates
included in the analysis, while also adding a measure of
Relative strength between government and rebel parties,
which derives from the NSA’s ‘Rebel strength’ variable
(Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013). Full results
are provided in the Online appendix. Consistent with
Walter (2002) and Mattes & Savun (2009), I find no
clear evidence that a certain set of antecedent conditions
helps to predict an agreement to share power. Neverthe-
less, the empirical analysis controls for a range of struc-
tural, conflict- and content-related factors that might
have an independent effect on the likelihood of conflict
termination, independent of power-sharing.7
Control variables
Variation in state capacity impacts the ability of the
government party to implement concessions, as well as
that of rebels to return to the battlefield. The data there-
fore include the following measures: annual GDP per
capita in current USD, from the 2019 World Develop-
ment Indicators; Military size as soldiers per capita, from
the COW2 National Material Capabilities dataset v5
(Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972);8 and Mountainous
terrain as a proportion of land area (Fearon & Laitin,
2003). To combat missing observations, data on income
in Afghanistan, Moldova, Lebanon, and Cambodia are
5 For a recent analysis of the relationship between constraining
institutions – such as veto rights – and conflict onset, see Gates
et al. (2016).
6 Following Cheeseman (2015: 212), I exclude the implementation
of PR rules in presidential systems, since elections in which ‘only one
person can emerge victorious are inherently winner takes all’. See also
Sartori (1994).
7 I do not control for Relative strength in the main analysis for two
reasons. First, the NSA dataset censors cases after 2011, restricting the
number of observations. Second, the inclusion of a categorical
variable precludes the use of Clarify and Spost packages for
interpreting regression results. I have tested the main regression
models with the inclusion of Relative strength and find the results
unchanged. See the Online appendix.
8 See also Doyle & Sambanis (2000).
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imputed from the Maddison Project Database, and a
small number of gaps in military size are repeated from
the most recent available year.
Certain kinds of conflicts are argued to be more resis-
tant to settlement, such as wars over territory or those in
more diverse contexts (Fortna, 2008; Hartzell & Hod-
die, 2007; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Doyle & Samba-
nis, 2000; Kaufmann, 1996; Licklider, 1995). To
capture diversity, the dataset relies on Fearon’s (2003)
Ethnic fractionalization index. Using UCDP/PRIO data,
I include measures of conflict Duration in months
(Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013), total Battle-deaths
attributed to the conflict dyad (Pettersson, Högbladh
& Öberg, 2019), and a dummy variable for Territorial
conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Any groups not
included in the UCDP Battle Deaths dataset are consid-
ered to be in low-intensity conflicts and are therefore
imputed as 25 deaths for each year they are in the Armed
Conflict dataset, as this the lowest threshold for inclusion
by conflict-year. To address endogeneity concerns, all
time-variant indicators are lagged one year from the sign-
ing of the settlement. Due to extreme variation, the
measures of income, terrain, population, duration, and
deaths are logged in order to improve linearity.
Finally, I control for settlement-specific factors. A
higher number of ‘veto players’ is presumed to raise the
potential for spoiling and cascading defection (Cunning-
ham, 2006, 2013; Downs & Stedman, 2002; Rudloff &
Findley, 2016; Bormann & Hammond, 2016). I there-
fore include a count of Settlement dyads, again relying on
the text and inclusion in the UCDP Armed Conflict
dataset. Beyond power-sharing, other provisions may
improve commitment by helping to assuage fears or
imposing additional costs on signatories (Mattes &
Savun, 2009). Dummy variables measure the inclusion
of provisions to invite international Peacekeepers (Walter,
2002; Fortna, 2008), recognize rebels as Political parties
(Matanock, 2017), grant a blanket Amnesty, or establish
inclusive commissions for Oversight or Arbitration
(Schneckener, 2002). All are measured as 1 if present
and 0 otherwise. Since the sample is skewed toward the
Post-Cold War period, all models also include a dummy
coded as 1 if the settlement was signed after 1989 and 0
otherwise. For reference, summary statistics for all vari-
ables are provided in the Online appendix.
Empirical analysis
The full results of the binomial logistic regression analy-
sis of conflict termination are provided in Table II.
Coefficients are reported as log odds units, and due to
the time invariance of some indicators, robust standard
errors are clustered by country. The findings discussed in
this section are robust to a number of alternative speci-
fications of the models, the sample, and the dependent
variable, which are available in the Online appendix.
Model 1 employs the broadest operationalization of
power-sharing, which is consistent with the standard
definition in the extant literature. It shows that, while
Any power-sharing is positively associated with conflict
termination, the correlation fails to meet the p < 0.05
threshold of statistical significance (Table II). When the
measure of power-sharing is disaggregated in Model 2,
however, the positive effect of Political: constitutional
provisions reaches the highest significance threshold
(p < 0.01), with the magnitude of the coefficient more
than doubling. In contrast, settlements that entail Polit-
ical: transitional bargains are significantly negatively asso-
ciated with conflict termination between dyads, all else
equal. This finding is robust to the addition of controls
capturing the presence of additional ‘fear-reducing pro-
visions’ (Mattes & Savun, 2009) in Model 3, such as
those involving amnesty, oversight, or peacekeeping. In
fact, none of these content-related factors has a consis-
tently significant effect on the likelihood of conflict ter-
mination when robust measures of power-sharing are
included in the analysis.
Models 2 and 3 provide strong initial support for H1,
but in order to illustrate the differential impact of
political power-sharing subtypes more concretely, I use
Clarify to generate simulated observations (Tomz, Wit-
tenberg & King, 2003). I first set each variable in Model
2 to its mean value, thereby replicating an ‘average’ con-
flict, and allow only the type of power-sharing to vary.9
In the baseline category of settlements that include no
power-sharing provisions, the predicted probability of
dyadic conflict termination is 58.25%. Changing the
value of Political: transitional power-sharing from 0 to
1 causes this probability to fall to just 21.7%, while on
the other hand, changing the value of Political: constitu-
tional provisions from 0 to 1 causes the likelihood to
increase to a striking 94.43%. I also examine whether
these effects are likely to hold in a particularly
9 Variables in Model 2 are set as follows: GDP per capita (log)¼ 6.39,
Military size per capita (log) ¼ 3.37, Mountainous terrain (log) ¼
2.35, Ethnic fractionalization ¼ 0.68, Territorial conflict ¼ 0,
Conflict duration in months (log) ¼ 4.06, Battle-deaths (log) ¼
6.11, Settlement dyads ¼ 2.48, Post-Cold War ¼ 1. The dummy
measures of Territorial conflict and Post-Cold War are set to the
median, rather than the mean, since these variables can only take
the form of 0 or 1 in the real world.
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Table II. Full results of the binomial logistic regression analysis of conflict termination, N ¼ 168 settlement dyads
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Any power-sharing 1.382
(0.821)
Political: constitutional 2.666** 2.399**
(0.708) (0.701)
Political: transitional –2.207** –2.6**
(0.632) (0.771)
Inclusive power-sharing 2.125** 2.248**
(0.676) (0.584)
Diffusive power-sharing 2.8** 2.942**
(0.781) (0.754)
Military power-sharing 2.545** 2.854**
(0.624) (0.678)
Troop integration –0.392 –0.775
(0.680) (0.670)
GDP per capita (log) 0.117 0.012 0.054 –0.033 0.101 0.147 0.171
(0.182) (0.222) (0.226) (0.212) (0.241) (0.179) (0.21)
Military size per capita (log) –0.309* –0.109 –0.108 –0.339** –0.416** –0.257* –0.36*
(0.142) (0.114) (0.143) (0.121) (0.149) (0.116) (0.153)
Mountainous terrain (log) 0.214 0.216 0.213 0.241 0.301* 0.168 0.166
(0.15) (0.179) (0.177) (0.187) (0.177) (0.156) (0.177)
Ethnic fractionalization –0.592 0.09 0.360 –0.237 –0.082 –0.745 –0.289
(0.945) (1.018) (1.059) (1.052) (1.162) (1.051) (1.162)
Territorial conflict 0.519 –0.724 –0.728 –0.876 –0.793 0.426 0.846
(0.46) (0.503) (0.58) (0.751) (0.887) (0.518) (0.6)
Conflict duration, months (log) 0.129 –0.098 –0.116 –0.005 –0.052 0.037 0.077
(0.212) (0.178) (0.174) (0.221) (0.2) (0.187) (0.183)
Battle-deaths (log) –0.176 –0.096 –0.085 –0.152* –0.123 –0.191* –0.182*
(0.08) (0.099) (0.1) (0.088) (0.095) (0.082) (0.094)
Settlement dyads, count –0.118 0.177 0.252* 0.026 0.0751 0.009 0.052
(0.105) (0.114) (0.146) (0.072) (0.086) (0.075) (0.09)
Post-Cold War 1.138 0.841 0.864 1.185* 1.415** 0.635 0.745
(0.599) (0.624) (0.539) (0.427) (0.416) (0.707) (0.675)
Provisions: peacekeepers 0.676 –0.003 0.308
(0.624) (0.397) (0.491)
Provisions: amnesty 0.571 1.086* 0.585
(0.479) (0.516) (0.44)
Provisions: political party 0.157 0.341 0.951*
(0.386) (0.537) (0.449)
Provisions: oversight –0.216 –0.346 –0.356
(0.578) (0.656) (0.611)
Provisions: arbitration 0.368 –0.191 0.284
(0.55) (0.983) (0.668)
Constant –2.092 –0.079 –0.971 –0.517 –2.113 –0.156 –1.26
(1.525) (1.928) (1.992) (1.509) (1.902) (1.265) (1.429)
Observations 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
Log likelihood –101.1 –78.05 –75.88 –74.67 –71.87 –94.74 –90.39
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.288 0.308 0.319 0.345 0.136 0.176
The dependent variable is conflict termination, coded as 1 if violence between the settlement dyad ceases within six months of the signing of
the settlement and lasts for at least five years. All data on conflict dates, duration, and intensity are from UCDP/PRIO. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered by country.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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challenging conflict environment – specifically, by
increasing conflict intensity (Battle-deaths) and state
strength (Military size) by one standard deviation. Even
under these adverse conditions, the likelihood of dyadic
conflict termination remains relatively unchanged with
Political: constitutional power-sharing provisions, at
90.87%.
To make the differential impact of political power-
sharing subtypes more intuitive, Figure 3 compares the
predicted probability of conflict termination in the base-
line category to those in which settlements include either
constitutional or transitional provisions. Again, all vari-
ables in Model 2 are set to their mean values, while I
allow variation in state military capacity, as it is the only
control variable appearing to have a somewhat consistent
effect on the prospects of conflict termination across
models. Where states are especially weak, the predicted
probability of conflict termination is relatively high even
without an agreement on power-sharing, but it
diminishes rapidly as state capacity increases. This pat-
tern is consistent with the theoretical logic described in
the third section, whereby rebels should perceive demo-
bilization as a particularly high-risk gamble as the mili-
tary advantage of the government party increases,
heightening incentives for pre-emptive defection. As Fig-
ure 3 illustrates, however, settlements that include long-
term constitutional guarantees remain exceedingly likely
to overcome these perverse incentives, regardless of the
government’s absolute advantage.
Models 4 and 5 test my argument against those who
suggest that bargains involving shared rule are inherently
fraught, especially as compared to the territorial decen-
tralization of power. Although the magnitude of the
effect is marginally larger for Diffusive power-sharing, the
findings in Table II reveal that Inclusive power-sharing is
also positively and significantly associated with dyadic
conflict termination, lending strong support to H2.
Setting all variables in Model 4 to their mean, the pre-
dicted probability of peace with the inclusion of either
inclusive or diffusive power-sharing provisions is 52.53%
and 67.46%, respectively. In other words, where formu-
las for shared rule involve ‘consociational’ institutions
that guarantee inclusion over the long term, settlements
have similarly positive prospects to those that achieve
segmental autonomy of groups. Moreover, when both
inclusive and diffusive subtypes are included in a settle-
ment, the likelihood of dyadic conflict termination
increases to 92.31%, which lends cursory support to
Hartzell & Hoddie’s (2007) argument that more com-
prehensive power-sharing solutions may have an additive
effect, helping to overcome commitment problems.
In order to test H3, Models 6 and 7 disaggregate
provisions for power-sharing in the military hierarchy
from those stipulating incorporation of rank-and-file
troops (Table II). As expected, Military power-sharing
is positively associated with dyadic conflict termination,
and the effect again reaches the highest significance level
(p < 0.01). In contrast, Troop integration does not have a
significant effect, although the coefficient is negative.
Using Clarify to simulate an average conflict, with all
other variables in Model 6 set to their mean, the pre-
dicted probability of conflict termination with Troop
integration alone is 29.08%. The addition of Military
power-sharing provisions, however, increases the prob-
ability to 82.15%, from a long shot to a safe bet. This
finding validates the notion that, according to the rea-
soning behind H3, rebel leaders are reluctant to concede
their capacity to wage war without additional guarantees
that they will have a stake in deciding how that capacity
is employed – or deployed – in the future. Furthermore,
it suggests that this more robust operationalization has
been doing most of the statistical work in previous stud-
ies that have found a positive effect for military power-
sharing while using integration as a measurement
criterion.
In sum, the findings of the logistic regression analysis
provide strong support for the three central hypotheses
of this study. All else equal, provisions that guarantee
inclusion in levers of decisionmaking beyond elections,
either in central governance or in the security sector,
significantly increase the willingness of rebel signatories
to accept the risk of demobilization. Bargains that miti-
gate incentives for pre-emptive defection are able to over-
come commitment problems even in the most difficult
contexts, and they appear significantly more effective
than other signaling mechanisms intended to improve
credibility, such as peacekeeping and oversight.
Figure 3. Differential impact of provisional power-sharing
subtypes on the predicted probability of conflict termination
744 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(4)
Conclusion
This study offers new and important insights about
power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict resolution and
democratization. It relies on a novel disaggregation of
settlement provisions to develop and test a theory of
pre-emptive rebel defection, which emphasizes the
importance of guarantees that offset the risk of compet-
ing in elections against an advantaged incumbent. The
key axis of variation hinges on whether settlements fall
into one of two categories: on the one hand, those that
leave the make-up of the post-conflict regime to be
decided by electoral victors, even if there is agreement
to share power during an interim period; and on the
other hand, those that entail robust and long-term
changes to the landscape of state power in ways that
reduce the imperative of mobilizing majority support
and of retaining the option to fall back on strategies of
violence, if necessary.
The logic behind this argument is not entirely unique.
It draws heavily on conventional wisdom in the com-
parative democracy literature, which recognizes that
institutions can be engineered to change the preference
ordering of competing elites and incentivize democratic
‘buy-in’ by reducing the stakes for perennial losers. The
distinction between long-term and short-term solutions
cuts across the four subtypes of power-sharing – political,
military, economic, and territorial – which have been the
focus of the current debate in the conflict literature, thus
raising the potential for improved coordination between
IR and comparative approaches in the future.
Further research is needed in two key areas. First,
although testing for conflict-related predictors of
power-sharing fails to reveal clear patterns (see Online
appendix), recent work shows that group elites may have
an incentive to seek ethnic power-sharing configurations
in light of demographic realities (Bormann, 2019; King
& Samii, 2018). International mediators and policy-
makers will look for lessons about why governments may
be willing to adopt certain packages of concessions. If
consociational reforms can be used to entrench a social
cleavage structure that grants incumbents the greatest
advantage, then power-sharing settlements may provide
yet another weapon in the arsenal of political elites seek-
ing to remain in power.
A second and closely related issue has been high-
lighted by recent episodes of violence in Lebanon, Mali,
and Mozambique – cases once considered to be conso-
lidated post-conflict democracies – evoking a long-
standing debate about the possible pernicious effects of
power-sharing on democratic quality and durability
(Norris, 2008). Larry Diamond (2015: 401) aptly points
out that, while ‘it is possible to implement peace without
democracy [ . . . ] it is not possible to build democracy
without peace’, and power-sharing solutions tend to
reflect such exigencies. However, many scholars argue
that power-sharing institutions cement wartime divisions
into democratic politics by elevating violence entrepre-
neurs into positions of power and incentivizing them to
mobilize support exclusively within their own social
groups (Jung, 2012; Horowitz, 1993, 2014). Work by
Sisk (2010) and McCulloch (2017) has shed light on
potential mechanisms for renegotiation, such as ‘sunset
clauses’, but more work is needed to analyse the potential
for power-sharing institutions to adapt to the changing
realities of a transition, even long after the dust has set-
tled on the original conflict.
Replication data
The dataset and do-file for the empirical analysis in this
article, along with the Online appendix, are available at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All analyses were con-
ducted using Stata 15.
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Kovacs (2009) The predicament of elections in war-torn
societies. Democratization 16(3): 530–557.
Horowitz, Donald L (1993) The challenge of ethnic conflict:
Democracy in divided societies. Journal of Democracy 4(4):
18–38.
Horowitz, Donald L (2014) Ethnic power sharing: Three big
problems. Journal of Democracy 2(2): 5–20.
Howe, Herbert (1997) Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and
regional peacekeeping. International Security 21(3):
145–176.
Jarstad, Anna (2006) The logic of power sharing after civil war.
Paper prepared for the workshop on Power-sharing and
Democratic Governance in Divided Society, Oslo, 21–22
August.
Jarstad, Anna & Desirée Nilsson (2008) From words to deeds:
The implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace
accords. Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(3):
206–223.
Jung, Jai Kwan (2012) Power-sharing and democracy promo-
tion in post-civil war peace-building. Democratization
19(3): 486–506.
Kaufmann, Chaim (1996) Possible and impossible solutions
to ethnic civil wars. International Security 20(4): 136–175.
King, Elisabeth & Cyrus Samii (2018) Minorities and mis-
trust: On the adoption of ethnic recognition to manage
conflict. Journal of Peace Research 55(3): 289–304.
Koko, Sadiki (2007) The ‘one-plus-four’ formula and transi-
tion in the Democratic Republic of Congo. African Security
Review 16(1): 33–47.
Kreutz, Joakim (2010) How and when armed conflicts end:
Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset.
Journal of Peace Research 47(2): 243–250.
Lake, David A & Donald Rothchild (1996) Containing fear:
The origins and management of ethnic conflict. Interna-
tional Security 21(2): 41–75.
746 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(4)
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